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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does Hirota Tekko, a Japanese manufacturer, have 
sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah for the Utah 
state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over it, when 
Hirota Tekko•s sole contact with the State of Utah is that its 
product allegedly caused injury within the State? 
2. Did Hirota Tekko waive its defense that the Utah state 
courts lack personal jurisdiction over it by sending a hand-
written letter to third-party plaintiff Mansour's counsel which 
disclaims any responsibility for plaintiff's alleged injuries? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 78-27-24(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) (set 
forth in Briefs of Appellants and Respondent Okada). 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set forth 
in Brief of Appellant). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case is adequately stated in the briefs of appellants 
and respondent Okada. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hirota Tekko had insufficient contacts with the State of 
Utah for the courts of this state to constitutionally exercise 
personal jurisdiction over it with regard to the plaintiff's 
claim. There was no purposeful direct contact between Hirota 
Tekko and the State of Utah. 
Hirota Tekko did not waive its personal jurisdiction 
defense by its letter to third-party plaintiff Mansour's 
counsel disclaiming liability. Under a prior holding of this 
Court, the letter did not constitute an answer or a general 
appearance and therefore cannot be construed as a waiver of 
defenses. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF HIROTA TEKKO 
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
By its ruling of February 25, 1986, as affirmed by its 
ruling of April 17, 1986, and as amended by its order of May 5, 
1986, the trial court dismissed Okada and Hirota Tekko from the 
instant action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Hirota Tekko 
submits that the trial court was correct in its dismissal of 
Okada and Hirota for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial 
court's ruling should be affirmed. 
1. Okada Hardware And Hirota Tekko Lack Sufficient 
Minimum Contacts With The State Of Utah To Subject 
Them To The Jurisdiction Of Utah Courts. 
Mansour and Okada have adequately set forth the general 
framework within which an jin personam jurisdiction inquiry is 
to be made, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
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in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958), World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 
L. Ed. 490 (1980), and their progeny. For the sake of brevity, 
that framework will not be restated or belabored here. 
Because Hirota Tekko is one step further removed from Okada 
in the distribution system and other occurrences which ulti-
mately placed the chopping maul, which allegedly caused the 
injury complained of, in the State of Utah, Okada's arguments 
in support of the trial court's ruling on appeal here are at 
least as compelling with regard to Hirota Tekko as Okada and 
are adopted herein by this reference. 
Hirota allegedly manufactured the chopping maul but did not 
export the product to the United States. There is no evidence 
that either Okada or Hirota sold or advertised any products in 
the State of Utah. R. 396. 
This court recently stated the test for determining whether 
sufficient minimum contacts exist for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction as follows: 
In order to determine whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice, this Court has recognized that "the central 
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction is 
the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation, to each other." The assessment of that 
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relationship involves determining whether the defen-
dant has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws," It must also be determined "[w]hether the 
cause of action arises out of or has a substantial 
connection with the activity; and . . . [there must be 
a] balancing of the convenience of the parties and the 
interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction." 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 
(Utah 1985) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Philadelphia 
Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 853 (1986), also discussed by Okada in its 
brief, is helpful in determining whether a nonresident defen-
dant has sufficiently "purposely availed" itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within a forum state to be 
subject to that particular forum's jurisdiction. In that case, 
Philadelphia Resins Corporation (hereinafter "PRC"), a Penn-
sylvania corporation, was sued in tort, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah by the insurer of a 
geophysical exploration company, Compagnie Generale de 
Geophysigne (hereinafter "CGG"). CGG, which was conducting 
seismic operations in Utah, contracted with one Randall Rogers, 
a helicopter pilot from Arkansas, to fly equipment and person-
nel to and from testing sites in the field. 
Prior to leaving for Utah, Rogers contacted PRC and ordered 
three synthetic fiber cables for use in suspending loads from 
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helicopters. Rogers contacted PRC after seeing an advertise-
ment for the cables in a trade magazine. Rogers told PRC that 
the cables were to be used in the Rocky Mountain region, but no 
particular state was mentioned. PRC shipped the cables to 
Rogers in Arkansas and Rogers brought them to Utah where they 
failed, causing damage to CGG. I_d. at 441, 442. 
In finding the district court lacked jin personam jurisdic-
tion over PRC, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found, 
M[t]here is no evidence that PRC advertises by any method 
specifically directed at the Utah market, nor is there any 
evidence that PRC employs any personnel in Utah." I_d. at 443. 
The court then noted: 
The sum total, then, of PRC's contacts in Utah are: 
(1) a miniscule number of sales of products other than 
"Phillystran" cable, (2) advertising in a national 
trade magazine that presumably reaches Utah, and (3) 
the failure of one of its defective "Phillystran" 
cables in Utah after the cable was taken there by one 
of its customers. 
Id. 
The court concluded: 
Although PRC•s employee may have known that the cable 
was destined for use in the Rocky Mountain region, 
which includes Utah, it was never specifically fore-
seeable by PRC that its product was destined for the 
Utah market. PRC' s relationship to the Utah market is 
simply too attenuated to support jLri personam juris-
diction under the "stream of commerce" theory . . . 
* * * 
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In this case, the only contact that PRC has with Utah 
which is related to the cause of action is the fact 
that a PRC product happened to fail and cause damage 
in the State. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court made it 
clear that a seller of chattels does not, in effect, 
"appoint the chattel his agent for service of pro-
cess." PRC's knowledge of the mere possibility that 
its product might be taken into a region of the 
country in which Utah is located is not sufficient, in 
our view, to make a difference in this regard. 
* * * 
We hold that PRC•s contacts with the state of 
Utah, as shown by the record, are insufficient to 
support the exercise of _in personam jurisdiction over 
PRC in accordance with the Due Process Clause. 
Id. at 446, 447 (citations omitted). 
The record in the case at bar indicates Hirota Tekko had 
only one of the three contacts with the State of Utah identi-
fied by the court in Philadelphia Resins, namely the presence 
of its product within the state. There is no evidence in the 
record that Hirota Tekko sold or advertised any of its products 
within the state. R. 396. The evidence indicates that the 
presence in Utah of the product in question, a maul, is 
entirely fortuitous. One Linda Thayne purchased the maul in 
Idaho as a Christmas present for her father, a Utah resident. 
There is no evidence that Hirota Tekko had anything to do with 
the maul finding its way into Utah. Thus, the purposeful 
availment needed for the exercise of personal jurisdiction is 
lacking. 
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Appellants state: 
The Japanese argument that the Utah courts do not 
have jurisdiction over them because this product was 
sold in Idaho is not logical. If this were true, then 
all manufacturers who sell products in Utah can only 
be responsible if the specific product in question is 
purchased in Utah. In today's marketplace, manufac-
turers such as Toyota, Datsun, and in this case, 
Hirota Tekko, serve to profit from the sale of their 
products in Utah. Therefore, they should subject 
themselves to the Utah court's jurisdiction no matter 
where the specific defective product that causes the 
problem may have been purchased. 
Brief of Appellants, pp. 14, 15. 
Appellants* argument is specious because while Toyota and 
Datsun engage in substantial advertising and sales within the 
State of Utah, there is no evidence Hirota sold or advertised 
any products or had any other contacts with Utah. The consti-
tutional touchstone - minimum contacts - is the same for 
Toyota, Datsun, Okada Hardware and Hirota Tekko. Such minimum 
contacts do not exist with regard to Okada or Hirota Tekko. 
As was stated in Hanson v. Denckla: 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot 
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum 
State. The application of that rule will vary with 
the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, 
but it is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws. 
357 U.S. at 253. 
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In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 
2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985), the Supreme Court stated: 
This "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a 
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely 
as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" 
contracts, or of the "unilateral activity of another 
party or a third person." Jurisdiction is proper, 
however, where the contracts proximately result from 
actions by the defendant himself that create a "sub-
stantial connection" with the forum state. 
105 S. Ct. at 2183 
In this case Hirota had one contact with the State of Utah; 
a product manufactured by it allegedly caused injury to a third 
person in Utah after a somewhat complicated set of transfers, a 
gift and a bailment. Appellants seem to be urging this court 
to reject the traditional "minimum contacts" inquiry and simply 
hold that a person or entity can be haled into a court anywhere 
in the world where one of their products causes damage, no 
matter how "random," "fortuitous" or "attenuated" the defen-
dant's contacts are with the forum. The approach suggested by 
appellants is unfounded in the law and should be rejected here. 
2. The Letter Sent To Mansour's Counsel By Masakazu 
Hirota, President Of Hirota Tekko, Was Not An Answer 
To The Third-Party Complaint And Therefore Did Not 
Waive Hirota*s Defense Of Lack Of Personal Jurisdic-
tion. 
On or about August 26, 1985, Masakazu Hirota, President of 
Hirota Tekko, sent two letters to Mansour's counsel, one 
written in Japanese and one written in English. The letter 
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written in English, which is apparently a translation of the 
letter written in Japanese, reads as follows: 
Second District Court 
In & For Davis County, 
State of Utah, 
Farmington 
Utah 84025 USA 
1985, 26 of August 
We haven't any responsibility about this matter, 
Civil No. 33206. 
Masakazu Hirota 
President of Hirota Tekko, K.K. 
4805 Kako 
Inamicho, Kakogun 
Hyogo, Japan 
(Signature of Mr. Hirota in 
Japanese) 
If there is any difference between the two, Japanese 
sentence and English sentence, in any case, Japanese 
sentence is right. 
On September 9, 1986, Mansour's attorney sent Mr. Hirota's 
letters to the trial court clerk for filing. R. 428. Although 
nowhere on either of Mr. Hirota's letters is it stated that the 
letters are an answer to the third-party complaint, Mansour has 
subsequently determined to refer to Mr. Hirota's letters as an 
"answer" or "pro se answer." See, Brief of Appellant, pp. 1 & 
5. 
In view of this court's decision in Fibreboard Paper 
Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 
(1970), appellants* contention that the letters Mr. Hirota sent 
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to Mansour's counsel constitute an answer to the third-party 
complaint is without merit. In the Fibreboard case, the 
plaintiff claimed that a letter the defendant wrote to the 
plaintiff's attorney, who then filed the letter with the clerk 
of the court, constituted an answer and a general appearance on 
behalf of the defendant. 475 P.2d at 1006. The letter reads 
as follows: 
Dear Sirs: 
This is in answer to complaint civil No. 184947. 
First: You claim that we are residents of Salt Lake 
County or have property in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
Answer: We moved to Pacifies, Calif, on 
March 8, 1965 and have been residents of 
Calif, since and we have never had property in 
Salt Lake County. 
Second: Mr. Knowlton, I once told you that this bill 
was not mine. And that the person responsible 
has used or signed my name, 'whichever the 
case.' 
Remarks: Last February, 1969, you had a wage attachment 
against me. I have suffered embrassment 
[sic], my job was jeopardized, and other 
personal effects. 
Now: I had to hire an attorny [sic] to get my money 
that was held for this attachment. The same 
Civil No. 184947. 
Please let me know if you are going to 
pursue this matter, 'if so,' I will let my 
attorny [sic] handle it. My compensation for 
this matter may be expensive. 
Ronald W. Dietrich 
Id. at 1007, nt. 1. 
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The court held that the letter did not constitute a general 
appearance, stating simply: "The claim of the plaintiff that 
the defendant Ronald W. Dietrich made a general appearance by 
the filing of his letter above referred to is without merit." 
Id. at 1006. An answer is always an appearance. Rio Del Mar 
Country Club v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 2d 214, 190 P.2d 
295, 300 (1948), 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appearance § 16 (1962). Hence, 
in Fibreboard, by finding that defendant Dietrich's letter was 
not a general appearance, this court necessarily determined 
that the letter was not an answer. Hirota Tekko's letter is 
not even styled as an answer, as was the Dietrich letter. 
Therefore, under the Fibreboard case, this court should find 
Hirota's letter neither to be an answer nor a general appear-
ance. 
It is significant that Mr. Hirota did not send his letter 
to the court, but merely sent it to Mansour's counsel. It 
would be patently unfair for this court to deem the filing of 
the letter by Mansour's counsel to be a general appearance and 
waiver of the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by 
Hirota. Generally speaking, an appearance is an overt act by 
which a party comes into court and submits himself to its 
jurisdiction. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appearance § 1 (1962); 6 C.J.S. 
Appearances § 2 (1975); see also Sharp v. Sharp, 196 Kan. 38, 
409 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Kan. 1966). Hirota took no such action to 
put itself before the court. Mansour's counsel should not be 
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found to have acted vicariously on Hirota Tekko's behalf to 
bring Hirota Tekko before the court. 
Additionally, the court below found that both Okada and 
Hirota were served between August 2 and August 10, 1985. 
R. 393. The court also found that counsel for each of the 
defendants requested and received an extension until January of 
1986 in which to file pleadings, which they did. R. 393. 
Mansour cannot consistently, on one hand, grant Hirota an 
extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, 
and then, on the other hand, assert that Mr. Hirota's letters 
constitute an answer to Mansour1s third-party complaint. 
Although Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states 
that "a party waives all defenses and objections which he does 
not present either by motion . . . or, . . . in his answer or 
reply," it would be fundamentally unfair and denial of due 
process to apply that rule to the circumstances of this case 
and hold that Hirota has waived its right to contest personal 
jurisdiction. A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and 
an intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied. American Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968). 
Here, Hirota's president, a Japanese citizen, who speaks 
English as a second language, and who likely has no 
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understanding of the American legal system, sent a one-sentence 
letter to Mansour's counsel denying all responsibility for the 
matter complained of. Certainly such action cannot be viewed 
as a knowing relinquishment of all possible defenses to the 
action against Hirota. The court should find, in accordance 
with the Fibreboard case, that the Hirota letter was neither an 
answer nor a waiver. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Hirota Tekko does not have sufficient minimum 
contacts with the State of Utah, it would be offensive to 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" to 
hale Hirota Tekko into Utah courts under the circumstances of 
this case. Also, Hirota Tekko did not waive the defense of 
lack of personal jurisdiction by sending letters to Mansour's 
counsel, which letters denied responsibility for the alleged 
injuries in the instant case. Therefore, respondent Hirota 
Tekko respectfully requests this court to affirm the district 
court's dismissal of the third-party complaint against Hirota 
Tekko. 
DATED this l*]iW day of November, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stephen J. Hi 
RyaW E. Tibbi 
Attorneys for Hirota Tekko 
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